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CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN GERMANY: II*

Hans Julius Wolfft
IV
THE TRIAL

A. General Principles
HE trial (Hauptverhandlung) is the main and central part of the
whole criminal proceeding. All that is brought forward in the trial
and only what is brought forward there can furnish the basis for the
verdict. Whatever has preceded the trial proper becomes irrelevant as
soon as the trial is opened.
The principles governing the trial are publicity, orality, immediateness, and concentration.
To the extent that space in the courtroom permits, any adult person
who is in full possession of his civic rights and who does not by his
attire or behavior violate the dignity of the court, has a right to attend
as a listener ( GVG l 69, 17 5) ; the press has access to any trial and is
permitted to publish truthful reports. Only if matters which endanger
the public order, safety, or mortality are discussed, may the public be
wholly or partially barred from the courtroom by an order of the.
court (GVG 172, 174, 175). Such limitation on publicity may also
extend to the statement of reasons for a judgment, but the sentence itself must be pronounced publicly in any case (GVG 173).
The principles of orality and immediateness require that everything
to be used by the court in forming its judgment must be produced
through the medium of the spoken word. No merely written evidence
is permitted. Documents and other writings, such as abstracts from the
record of previous convictions, must be read aloud at the public hearing; so must the records of judicial inspections of localities or objects
not present in the courtroom (StPO 249). Ordinarily the personal appearance and questioning of a witness cannot be replaced by the reading
of a written deposition (StPO 2 50). However, if a witness is no longer
available due to his disappearance, death, or mental disease, the minutes

T
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of a prior judicial interrogation may be read; the court may also order
that a witness be questioned by the Amtsgericht of his residence, and
content itself with a reading of his deposition if his personal appearance
is deemed impracticable ( StPO 251). The persons who render the
judgment must have been present throughout the trial (StPO 226);
consequently, in order to avoid the danger of a fruitless trial, a number
of deputy judges and Schoffen may be ordered to sit in on trials expected to be of long.duration; one of these can take over in case a judge
or Scho:ffe drops out for one reason or another ( GVG 192).
The principle of concentration requires that the trial proceed without substantial interruption. StPO 229 provides that no trial shall be
adjourned for more than three days. If the interval is longer, or a
person not present at an earlier hearing is called to the bench, the trial,
unlike a civil trial where only the last hearing counts, has to start all
over again. In fact most criminal trials are completed in one session;
the A.mtsgericht usually disposes of several cases at a single sitting.

B. The Prosecutor
No trial can be held without the constant attendance of a representative of the prosecution (StPO 226). It is not necessary, however,
that one and the same attorney represent the state throughout the trial.
Several attorneys may attend the trial, together or successively, and
distribute various prosecuting functions among themselves ( StPO 22 7),
and_ in trials of long duration the prosecution's representative is occasionally changed. The person to represent the state at the trial is
selected by the chief prosecutor at the court of trial. This person does
· not have to be, and frequently is not, the same attorney as the one who
conducted the investigation prior to the trial.

C. The Accused
The accused has the right and duty of attendance. Ordinarily no
trial should be held in his absence, and the court has at its disposal
various II).eans of securing his attendance. It may order his arrest and
take steps to prevent his unauthorized leaving the court before the end
of the trial (StPO 230,231, 236).
· However, the requirement of attendance is not without exceptions.
If the accused fails to attend the trial after his own examination has
been complbted, the court may proceed with the case unless his presence
is needed (StPO 231). In certain cases of minor importance a trial already scheduled may be held in his absence; the accused in this case may
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indeed, by demand to be made within a week after the judgment has
been served on him, obtain a new trial, unless he was represented by
authorized counsel for the defense. Also the trial of other misdemean:..
ors and petty offenses may begin in the absence of the defendant, provided he is absent with the court's permission. In this case, however,
no judgment can be handed down until or unless the accused has been
examined by some judge, whether in the course of a preliminary examination or by an Amtsrichter at the request of the trial court (generally:
StPO 232-235).
Furthermore, under certain circumstances a case may be prosecuted
even against a person who is absent or whose whereabouts is unknown.
Under pre-Nazi law (StPO 277) this was possible only when the sentence would involve no more than a fine and/or confiscation of objects
produced by the punishable act or used for its perpetration. The accused in this case might employ counsel for his defense, and his relatives were legally empowered to answer for him even without his
authorization; any of these persons might also file appeals or other
objections on his behalf (StPO 280,282). Hitler's Strafprozessnovelle
of 1935 has amended the pertinent chapter of the StPO. The new
provisions (276-282b) in effect amount to a reversal of the former
principle. The state's attorney may now proceed against a "fugitive
from justice" in regard to any crime; a person is deemed a fugitive
who has left the country or is in hiding. Such prosecution takes place, if
"the people's sense of justice" demands the punishment of the criminal; but there is to be no prosecution if the early return, extradition, or
apprehension of the fugitive can be expected or the sentence will be
entirely incapable of enforcement in his absence. In all these absentee
proceedings the summons can be served by publication; 41 it must contain a warning that trial will be held in the accused's absence and that
the sentence will be enforced.42 The court ex officio appoints counsel
for the defense. The sentence must be expressly characterized as one
against an absent person; it is served by publication and enforced as far
as possible; but it must be served again personally on the defendant
if and when he becomes available. And the defendant may within a
week apply for a new trial if he can excuse his absence or if other circumstances make a new trial advisable. The trial will be suspended
and no sentence handed down, if the evidence is inconclusive and
41 See the description of this method, Shartel and Wolff, "Civil Justice in Germany," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 863 at 877 (1944).
42 To secure the enforcement of a fine likely to be inflicted, the court may order
the attachment of property belonging to the absent accused (StPO 283, 284).
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neither· the guilt nor the innocence of the absent defendant can be
definitely established.
In case the absent person cannot be tried, both old and new law
provide for a special proceeding to perpetuate testimony (StPO 285294). In this proceeding the defendant may be represented by counsel who may be appointed by his relatives, but he is not entitled to any
notifications beyond the first summons which, in case his whereabouts
is unknown, can be served by publication. If circumstances justify the
issuance of a warrant for the arrest of the fugitive, the court may, as an
indirect means of coercion, order the seizure of any of his assets and
property which are within the borders of the German Reich, with the
consequence that he is deprived, for the duration of such attachment,
of his ability to dispose of them inter vivos. As a special measure, the
court may, in its discretion, grant the fugitive safe conduct; this protects him against detention until conviction of the crime charged, but
not against arrest for other offenses or for the purpose of executing the
sentence to be handed down in the trial (StPO 295).
Finally, any trial may proceed temporarily in the absence of the
accused, if, by special order of the court, the reasons for which must
be stated, the accused is barred from the courtroom on account of his
disorderly conduct (see GVG 177) or because it is feared that a codefendant or witness will withhold the truth if questioned in his presence. In the juvenile courts the accused may also be temporarily excluded if there is danger that a certain discussion will unfavorably
influence his character. In all these cases the presiding judge is required
to reveal to the accused after his re-admission. the main results of the
hearings and discussions held in his absence (StPO 247, JGG 33).

D. Counsel for the Defense
At every stage of a criminal proceeding, i.e., both before and during the trial, an accused is entitled to counsel if he so desires ( StPO
137).43 Counsel is legally required in jury cases and in trials before
Special Tribunals and higher courts; counsel is also necessary when the
prisoner is deaf or dumb, is a fugitive from justice, or is liable to be
sentenced to confinement in an asylum, to administrative detention, to
castration, or to exclusion from an occupation.«
48 StPO 140 as amended by a statute of November 24, 1933; StPO 2$1 in 'its
form as laid down by StPNov art. 6; sec. IO of the decree of March 21, 1933; JGG
29.
,
44 To be distinguished from counsel is the legal representative (Beistand, literally:
helper). This is a person frequently required or authorized in German procedure. The
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The accused may appoint counsel of his own choice. This can be
any lawyer admitted to the bar of a German court, whether the court of
trial or another; any instructor of law in a German university; and, subject to approval by the court, any other person, especially an official of
the judiciary who is not a judge, such as a clerk or a Referendar (StPO
138, cf. also 144). In the People's Tribunal the accused's choice of
counsel needs always to be approved by the court (art. IV, sec. 3 of the
law of April 24, 1933).45
Lawyers appointed by the court as counsel for the defense are
compensated by the state with a legally fixed fee; the compensation
can be recovered from the defendant if he is sentenced to punishment
(StPO 150). Several persons may act as counsel jointly or successively
(StPO 227), and one person may be charged with the defense of several defendants as long as such joinder does not interfere with effective
defense of each (StPO 146).
Counsel for the defendant has legal authority to act in his behalf
at every stage of the proceedings.46 Counsel is entitled to notice of hearings and other steps to be taken by the court (see, e.g., StPO 193, 224,
225, 233) and to a formal summons for the trial (StPO 218). He
may, on behalf of his client, make any application to the court; more
especially, he may file an appeal unless expressly forbidden to do so by
his client (StPO 297). He can be called to the witness stand/1 but may
refuse testimony with respect to facts revealed to him in confidence by
guardian or statutory agent of a child or insane person and the husband of an accused
woman are typical representatives. These have the right to be notified of the time and
place of the trial and to defend the accused (StPO 149). In juvenile matters the court
can appoint a representative; it must appoint the municipal board for juvenile care
(Jugendamt) on the demand of the board (JGG 29). The participation of a representative does not ordinarily dispose of the need of having counsel for the defense.
45
_ Where counsel is requisite the court has to make the appointment when it gives
the defendant notice of the information filed against him or of the order to hold for
trial, unless the accused himself has already appointed counsel of his own choice. The
Amtsgericht (single judge or Schoffengericht) has to appoint counsel in a felony case
if the accused so requests within three days after having been served with the information or the order to hold for trial, and in all other cases the court may appoint counsel
ex officio or at the request of the accused whenever it deems it advisable to take such
action (StPO 140, 141).
6
' The only exception is the rule that in the preliminary judicial examination the
prosecuted person should be questioned in the absence of both counsel for prosecution
and defense (StPO 192).
47
In case of conflicting interests his public duty as a witness takes priority over
his duty as counsel for the defense, with the possible consequence that he may have to
resign the defense.
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the accused (StPO 53 no. 2); he cannot be forced to hand over objects
in his possession which may be used as evidence against his client ( StPO
95). He has, subject to certain conditions, a legal right to inspect the
papers of the court and a right to communicate with his client (StPO
r47, r48).
In the Code of Criminal Procedure there is found no restraint on
the devices which counsel may use in defense of a client. However,
strong barriers against unethical methods have been erected by professional standards, which, in the case of lawyers, have been laid down
by special honor courts provided for in the organic statute for the legal
profession. In particular, an attorney is not permitted to work for a
decision which in his own conviction would be contrary to justice, e.g.,
to plead for the acquittal of the accused if the latter has privately adm}tted his guilt. The lawyer may still emphasize all circumstances that
make for a mild judgment, but is barred from pretending that his client
is innocent; and in an extreme case he may be under the obligation to
resign the defense. On the other hand, in determining the course to be
followed, defense counsel is not dependent on the defendant's consent
and, except in matters of appeal,' may take such steps as he considers
necessary even against defendant's protest. ,

E. The Injured Party
The following are entitled to join the state's attorney as co-prosecutors (Nebenklager) (generally: StPO 395,403):
( r) Persons who are legally empowered to start a private prosecution (see note 23, supra);
' (2) Persons who, having suffered injury to ~ife, health, liberty,
personal status, or pecuniary interests, have obtained a judicial order
for prosecution under StPO r 72 ( see topic III, subtopic B, supra) ;
(3) Persons who, under the rules of substantive criminal law, may
1
claim a private penalty (Busse).48
•
Any of these persons may at any stage of a pending proceeding join
the prosecution by filing a .written declaration of j oinder; the court
48 The Busse is an institution of the criminal law. It can be claimed in certain
cases, such as insult, defamation, corporal injury; it is imposed in addition to the
criminal punishment inflicted and is dependent on conviction. (See StGB 188, 231,
StPO 404). Although the filing of a claim for a Busse precludes the claimant from
also filing a civil tort action for damages, the Busse is not an indemnity adjudicated
according to principles of private law. It is a personal satisfaction for the injured
party; its amount is freely determined by the court and not necessarily controlled by
the amount of the actual damage; it cannot exceed 10,000 Reichsmark (decree of
- February 6, 1924); only the injured party himself but not his heir can demand it.
Therefore the -filing of a claim for a Busse should not be confused with the French
action d' adhesion by which the partie cirnle can seek damages in the criminal trial.
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decides on the right to join (StPO 396). The co-prosecutor acquires a
status analogous to that of a private prosecutor (StPO 397) and may
file an appeal independently of the state's attorney (StPO 401). Apart
from this, proceedings are little affected, and the prosecution remains
primarily in the hands of the state's attorney.
F. Scope of the Trial
StPO 264 provides that the "act defined in the information" ( die
in der Anklage bezeichnete Tat) determines the subject matter of the
trial. While the Code thus sets definite limits to the scope of a criminal
trial, it does not purport to empower the prosecutor to fix finally and
for all purposes the facts to which the investigation by the tribunal will
extend. The accusation-principle notwithstanding, German criminal
procedure is not built around a formal charge. The "act defined in the
information" is no more and no less than the historical event which is
supposed to constitute or involve an offense. The court has the duty
and the power to explore on its own motion this event, in order to
attain the highest possible degree of historical and legal truth. This
basic principle leads to two important consequences.
On the one hand, every fact discovered in this process is subject to
scrutiny as to its possible criminal character, as long as it does not lie
outside the bounds of the historical incident referred to in the prosecutor's information. On the other, there is nothing to prevent a change
of the theory of prosecution; the trial court is not bound by the legal
characterization which the prosecutor may have ascribed to defendant's
act when he filed the information, nor is the subsumption made by l:he
court itself in its order to hold for trial conclusive in this respect ( StPO
264). If during the trial new facts are uncovered which may involve
the application of a legal rule different from the one cited in the information or the order ( for example, what appeared to be a case of
embezzlement may turn out to be a case of larceny) ; if the historical
event under examination is found to contain the elements of more
crimes than had originally been assumed to have been perpetrated ( e.g.,
if new offenses are discovered in the complex of facts constituting the
event or if what appeared to be a continued crime turns out to be a sequence of separate crimes of like character) ; or if special aggravating
circumstances are discovered-in all these cases the trial must proceed.
The court h"as to extend its investigation to the new circumstances and
consider them in reaching its judgment.49
49
This situation is in fact not different from the one where the court finds that
the prosecutor in his information has made erroneous statements as to facts (for example,
that he has indicated a wrong date for the perpetration of the crime subject to the
prosecution).
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The only effects of a shift of theory such as has been described are
two: ( l) The court must inform the accused of the new situation or
the new charge to be raised against him and give him a chance to prepare his defense accordingly; if necessary, it has to stay the proceedings ( StPO 26 5). ( 2) If the new charge would exceed the jurisdiction
of the court in which the case is pending ( for example, if the Scho:ffengericht discovers that a homicide being tried by it is probably murder
or voluntary manslaughter, not involuntary manslaughter, and therefore a case for the Schwurgericht), the case must be certified to the
proper tribunal; this order is equivalent to an order to hold for trial
before that court ( StPO 2 70), and the latter cannot refuse jurisdiction
of the case, nor can the prosecutor or defendant contest the order.50
G. The Course of the Trial
When the order to hold for trial has been issued the judge who is
to preside fixes the date and hour for the trial ( StPO 213). The trial
should be held as soon as circumstances and the court's docket permit;
and in most cases it occurs within a few weeks. Sometimes, however,
the necessary preparatory steps involve some delay; especially, the
court may find it necessary to order an examination of witnesses whose
summoning appears impracticable or to order an inspection of a distant
-place or thing by the local judge (StPO 223, 225). Furthermore, in
all cases sufficient time must be allowed the state's attorney for summoning the accused, his counsel, witnesses and other persons needed,
and, for procuring documents and other objects to be produced at the
trial (StPO 214). The accused is entitled to a period of at least one
week between service of summons and hearing; noncompliance with
this provision will, at his demand, result in a staying of the trial (StPO
217 )_51
The trial fully reflects the basic conception that prosecution is a proceeding of the sovereign state against its subject. This is true as to both
its outward picture and the legal rules governing its organization and
course.
The entire court,· including both professional and lay judges, sits
behind a long desk at the ends of which also the recorder and the
prosecutor have their seats. The accused's place is on one side of the
50
In the opposite· case, i.e., where the court finds that the case really falls in the
jurisdiction of a lesser court than itself, it has nevertheless to render judgment, (StPO
269). Accordingly, if it disagrees with the court that has certified a case to it, it
simply ,tries the case on the original theory.
51
In cases coming before the Nazi Special Tribunal the period is three days and
can be shortened by the court to twenty-four hours. For further exceptions, see topic
III, subtopic E, supra.

1 944}

GERMAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE

courtroom in front of the desk; he is kept in a confined space only if
he is in custody. His counsel sits in front of him, or beside him, close
enough to maintain constant contact throughout the trial. There is no
special witness stand like that in an American courtroom; the accused
answers from the place where he sits, other persons stand before the
desk while being questioned.
The leading figure in the trial is the presiding judge. Though rulings are made by the court as a whole, it is he who conducts the trial,
gives orders concerning the sequence of procedural steps, is responsible
for the maintenance of order during the hearing, etc. (StPO 238,
GVG 176). More especially, it is the presiding judge who in the first
place examines the accused, witnesses, and experts. He is indeed bound,
on request, to allow judges, lay judges, the prosecutor, and accused
and his counsel to ask direct questions ( StPO 240), but even in this
case the initiative remains with him; he may, on his own motion, withdraw his permission if unsuitable questions are asked, or call for a decision by the court if a doubt arises as to the propriety of a question
( StPO 241, 242). There is no such thing as the distinct direct and
cross-examination as developed under common law. It is true that the
Code (239) makes possible a somewhat similar procedure by providing
that the presiding judge, on the joint demand of the prosecutor and the
accused or his counsel, has to turn over to them the questioning of their
respective witnesses and permit examination of opposing witnesses. But
even in this case the presiding judge retains the power of control and
may, after the "parties" have concluded their examinations, ask any
questions he deems necessary. In actual practice little use is made of
this procedure; experiments which several years ago were conducted
with an eye to possible adoption of the Anglo-American system of direct
and cross-examination do not seem to have met with success or general
approval.
The German trial, as compared with the American, is distinguished
by a definite lack of formality. Its objective is to ascertain, as far as
possible, the objective truth, on the basis of an oral hearing and by way
of a free valuatio!]. of the evidence ( StPO 261) little hampered by
formal rules of evidence. The investigation by the court is not confined to such proofs as are produced by the "parties"; it may ex officio
order the production of evidence not named by either of them. Especially, a wide discretion is enjoyed by the court as regards the use of
experts. Although before 1935 the court might not refuse to examine
an expert summoned at the instance of the state's attorney or the
accused except under special circumstances ( see below), the selection of
experts is primarily the court's business; it must indeed give preference
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to experts whose names are listed in the official roster (StPO 73). It
may also order further investigation by the same experts or submit the
same question to more experts ·of it~ own choice (StPO 83). It is
obvious that such provisions make available to the court more trustworthy technical opinions and spare it the necessity of deciding scientific
questions on the basis of onesided views of handpicked experts. 52
The hearing begins with the ascertainment that all persons are
present whose attendance is required. Witnesses a:nd experts are given
a brief instruction by the court regarding the character of their duties.
Then the witnesses, but,not the experts, are directed to remain outside
the courtroom until they are called to the stand. This exclusion is en- .
forced in the interest of spontaneous and unbiased testimony; witnesses
are not ordinarily allowed to hear either the_ examination of the accused
or that of any preceding witness ( StPO 243, 59). ·
The.general instruction of witnesses is followed by an examination
of the accused regarding personal facts not directly involved in the
· charge, such as his identity, age, prior convictions, etc.58
After the preliminaries just mentioned (StPO 243), the order to
hold defendant for trial is read. This act marks the beginning of the
trial proper. From this moment a defendant can no longer raise objections to being tried by this court or at this time, such as failure to allow
the proper period of time between summons and trial (StPO 217) or
the lack of territorial jurisdiction in the trial court (StPO 16); nor can
he any longer challenge a judge for bias or other cause (StPO 24,
25).55
I
fi;l

52
The particular function of the expert, combined with the great discretionary
power of the judge in making use of the expert, has resulted in some _provisions which
confer on the expert a status of an aid to the court rather than that of a mere witness.
The judge may direct his activities (StPO 78). In insanity•cases he may order, at the
instance of the expert but po~ibly against the will of the prosecutor or defendant', that
the accused be confined to a public asylum for the purpose of observation (maximum
length of the confinement: 6 weeks) (StPO 81). The expert enjoys the privilege of
being present at the trial even before his own examination; he may see the files and
direct questions to the accused and the witnesses (StPO 80). His impartiality can be
challenged for the same reasons as that of a judge (StPO 74). Cf. Ploscowe, "The
Expert Witness in Criminal Cases in France, Germany, and England," 2 L. AND CoN-

TEMP. PROB.
58

504 (1935).

The showing of earlier convictions of the accused is usually made by the reading
of an abstract from the register of convictions, which is kept by the state's attorney's
office at the Landgericht for the birthplace of every person.
154
As there exists n~ order to hold for trial in the procedure of the Nazi political
tribunals, the above-mentioned effect in these cases attaches to the beginning of the
examination of the accused.
55
Some objections can· be raised at any time, e.g., the bar of the statute of limita1
tions or the prohibition of double jeopardy; they are not waivable and are required to
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The next step is the examination of the accused with respect to the
charge. This is done in a rather informal way, determination of the
method being left to the discretion of the presiding judge. German law
does not call for a formal plea of guilty or not guilty; an admission of
guilt made at any stage of the proceeding, either in or out of court, is
valued as evidence, and the court may draw therefrom any conclusion
it sees fit to draw. The defendant is encouraged to tell his story in his
own way and-without interruption; but court, prosecutor, defense counsel, and co-defendants may freely ask questions or help or contradict the
defendant by reminding him of facts. The defendant is under no
obligation to answer. He may keep silent or even tell lies without running any risk other than a possible unfavorable influence upon the
measure of his punishment. No oath can be administered to him.
- Ordinarily defendants are not reluctant to answer, and confessions are
frequent.
The hearing of other evidence follows immediately upon the examination of the accused (StPO 244). It is not formally a separate
stage of the trial in the sense that it depends, like the taking of evidence
in civil procedure/ 6 on a proof-order or that entrance into it bars further
examination of the accused. It may extend to a reading of documents,
inspection of objects and localities, and examination of witnesses and
experts. In view of the principle of free valuation of the evidence, no
statutory rules exist as to the admissibility of questions to be put to
witnesses and experts. Hearsay evidence is not excluded. Certain rules,
however, have been established by court practice. Chief among them
are the requirement of relevance and the prohibition of leading questions; but the requirement of relevance does not of course bar questions
put forward for the purpose of testing the reliability of a witness.
Testifying, whether in the capacity of a witness or of an expert,
is a public duty, but involves a moderate compensation in an amount
to be fixed by the court ( StPO 7 I, 84). Witnesses and experts are
summoned by subpoena good anywhere in the Reich. An unexcused
failure to obey a subpoena, as well as a groundless refusal to testify or
to take an oath, can be punished by fine or, in the case of a witness, detention up to six months. Additional costs caused by such disobedience
fall on .the disobedient person. The court can fqrther order the arrest
of a disobedient witness for the purpose of enforcing his appearance,
but can not detain him in anticipation of a future hearing (StPO 48, 51,
be acted on by the court on its own motion. They result in a judgment dismissing the
prosecution.
116
See Shartel and Wolff, "Civil Justice in Germany," 42 MICH. L. REV. 863
at 883 (1944).
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70, 72, 77). The duty to obey the subpoena is absolute; but witnesses
who are or were engaged or married to the accused or are his or her
close relatives by blood or marriage are entitled to refuse testimony; so
are clergymen, lawyers, and physicians with respect to questions concerning knowledge acquired in connection with the performance of their
professional duties, unless the interested party has relieved them of
their duty of secrecy (StPO 52, 53). 57 Public officials need permission
by their superiors to reveal confidential knowledge acquired in their
official capacity (StPO 54). Testimony can also be refused by anybody
who has reason to fear that it will result in making him or persons related to him liable to prosecution ( StPO 55).58 This privilege is absolute and cannot be circumvented by the prosecutor through a promise
of immunity; the practice of "turning state's evidence" is unknown in
Germany.
The examination of witnesses is conducted in the same manner as
, that of the accused. The examination extends to common personal matters, such as name, age, occupation, and residence, as well as to questions which the court may deem suited to test the reliability of the
witness (StPO 68, 69). Before entering on the examination, the presiding judge has to explain to each witness separately his possible
privilege to refuse testimony and to make sure that the witness is willing to waive his privilege, if any. Even after the examination starts,
the witness remains at liberty to avail himself of his privilege at any
time.
Witnesses are supposed to testify to facts, not to express opinions;
and they are required to give their testimony orally in open court
( StPO 2 50). So long as the witness is available, this method cannot
be replaced by a reading of records of earlier statements (StPO 251);
nor can such a reading replace the testimony of a witness who rightfully refuses to testify in the trial ( StPO 252). However, the court may
aid a witness whose memory fails-him by reading to him the record of
testimony given in an earlier stage of the proceeding (StPO 253). The
examination of an expert must also be oral; a written opinion sub57
A statute of I 926 extended this privilege further to the editor, publisher,
printer, and any other person connected with the technical process of production of a
newspaper or other periodical with respect to the identity of the author of an incriminating contribution, if an editor of the periodical has been punished or may be
punished on account of the offense involved in the contribution (StPO 53 no. 4).
58
The privilege is broader in a civil trial; there the witness may refuse to' testify
if his testimony would disgrace him or his near relatives; Code of Civil Procedure
384 no. 2.
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mitted by him cannot, in contrast with the common practice in civil
procedure, be used as evidence in the trial. s9
Down to r933 every witness and expert, with certain exceptions,
had to be examined under oath, and the oath was administered before
his examination. A statute of November I I, I933, changed this and
assimilated in this respect criminal procedure to civil procedure. The
oath is now taken after the testimony, leaving to the witness a chance to
correct false or careless statements. The new law also greatly enhanced
the court's discretion as to the use of oaths. It retains the old prohibition against questioning on oath of youths under sixteen years of age,
of persons convicted of perjury, and of persons suspected or convicted of being participan.ts in, or accessories to, the offense being tried;
and it permits the court to waive the oath, not only, as fprmerly, of
young persons (under eighteen), relatives, and those who by a truthful testimony may put themselves or their relatives in jeopardy, but
also of those whose testimony, in the opinion of all members of the
court, is without importance qr obviously false, as well as of persons
whose swearing is waived by both the prosecution and the defense. An
even greater discretion is vested in the court in regard to petty offenses
and cases brought before it by private prosecution. This statute was the
consummation of a long struggle against the "perjury-epidemic'' whose
cause had been largely a needless use of the witness-oath in all cases.
As regards the scope of the taking of _evidence, a very dangerous
change was wrought by the Nazi Strafprozessnovelle. Under the
former law (StPO 246) it was the duty of the court in all cases except
those concerning petty offenses or brought before it by private prosecution to extend its examination to all the evidence produced at the trial
by either side,6° unless the evidence had been produced maliciously for
the purpose of causing delay. The new statute grants to the Amtsgericht, whether sitting as a single judge or as Schoffengericht, and to
the Landgericht as appellate court, full discretion as to the scope of the
examination. Even earlier this discretion had been vested in the Special
Tribunals. The power of other courts to reject evidence proffered was
still rather restricted, though less so than under the pre-Nazi Code,61
s9 Only in the preliminary proceedings may the judge content himself with a
written opinion (StPO 82).
60
The accused may demand that a witness or expert be summoned, even if the
presiding judge refuses to order his citation (StPO 219); in this case he has to offer
compensation for expenses (StPO 220).
61 The court may, under the law of 1935, reject evidence when it deems the fact

168

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

·but the war emergency decree of September 1, 1939, extended the wide
discretion to all courts.
The trial ends with the 'arguments of the prosecutor, of counsel for
the defense, and of the accused himself. The prosecutor speaks first.
The accused must always be allowed the last word, even when he is
represented by counsel; frequently, however, defendants declare that
they have nothing to add or content themselves with a mere assertion
that they are innocent or with a plea for mild punishment (StPO 258).
Minutes must be taken of ~he whole trial and be signed by the presiding judge and the recorder (StPO 271). The latter is always a
minor official of the court, whether a clerk or a Referendar. The general difference in character of the German tria_l from the American trial
is the reason why the German minutes differ greatly from those taken
in an American trial. The lack of formal rules of evidence makes it unnecessary to fill great numbers of pages with a detail_ed stenographic
report of everything that is said at the trial. The purpose of the minutes
is to show the general course of the trial, the observance of the required
formalities, and the main contents of statements made by accused, witnesses and experts. Therefore the minutes contain only the following
items: (1) the time and place of the trial, (2) the names of the judges
and other persons participating, (3) a brief characterization· of the
chargy and a description of important and required steps and events,
( 4) a record of incidental rulings, ( S) very. summary records of statements made by the defendant, witnesses, and experts, ( 6) the contentions and prayers of prosecution and defense, ( 7) the sentence ( StPO
272, 273). Great responsibility attaches to the recorder, since he himself drafts the abridgments of statements, even as they are being made
to the court. The minutes are.the only.evidence for the observance of
any rules concerning formalities of the procedure. The record is unimpeachable, except that deliberate falsification of the record may be
proved (StPO 274).
V
THE JUDGMENT

A. Form and Content
When the trial is finished the cou~t, i.e., professional and lay judges
together,62 withdrew for a secret deliberation.68 ·The law makes a few
to be evident anyway or unimportant, or when it considers the offer intended to cause
delay, or when the evidence is unavailable (StPO 245 in its form as given by StPNov
art. 1, sec. 3).
.
,
62
Only judges actually taking part in the decision and persons serving as legal
apprentices (Referendar} with the court are allowed to attend (GVG 192, ~93).
68
The result is usually a judgment, although it happens sometimes that the court .
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requirements on the form and method of voting. 64 On the issue of guilt
a decision against the accused requires a two-thirds majority of the
aggregate of professional and lay judges. The same majority is necessary to fix the punishment (StPO 263). On all other points and issues
(such as rulings on questions of proof) a bare majority of the court
suffices. Once a judgment is reached, it is a judgment of the court as a
whole; no dissenting view can be expressed.
The judgment is pronounced by the presiding judge publicly ( GVG
I 73). In most cases this follows immediately on the trial and deliberation, but the court may adjourn and call another sitting, within a week's
time, for this purpose. In contrast with common practice in civil procedure, the presiding judge must add a brief oral summary of the reasons. The tenor of the judgment is recorded literally in the minutes of
the "trial (StPO 268).
Ordinarily within a week, the reasons for the judgment have to be
embodied in a written statement, which may either be added to the
minutes or be combined with the judgment in a separate document. All
the professional judges who took part in reaching the judgment have
to sign it (StPO 275).
The statement of reasons in a criminal judgment di:ffers substantially from the statements of allegation and claims (Tatbestand) and
of reasons (Urteilsgriinde) in a civil judgment.65 Since there are no
parties in the true sense of the word in criminal procedure, no statement
of allegations and claims is needed. Instead, the statement of reasons in
a criminal judgment is one continuous text. It gives a statement of
facts, including a discussion of contentions and proofs, and the legal
conclusions of the court which justify the judgment. If the accused is
sentenced to punishment, the judgment must characterize his act in
terms of the le~l provision which makes it punishable (StPO 267).66
wants to clarify some point. This simply means that the trial is not yet concluded;
therefore prosecution and defense must once again be given a chance to put forward
final prayers and the accused must again be allowed the-last word.
64 The presiding judge is the chairman.
Lay judges vote before professional
judges, the younger votes before the older; but a specially appointed reporter always
votes first. The chairman votes last. Nobody is supposed to refuse voting on any question. If the majority required by law is not obtained, votes unfavorable to the accused
are counted for the suggestion next milder, until the majority is obtained (GVG 194197).
65 See Shartel and Wolff, "Civil Justice in Germany," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 863
at 890 (1944).
66 This provision originally corresponded to the nulla-poena,..sine-lege-principle of
•
the liberal state. The Nazis in their Strafprozessnovelle of 1935 have added a sec.
267a which adjusted the Code of Criminal Procedure to the principle of analogy
introduced by them into criminal law. A further weakening of the old rigidity of the

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

Every trial must terminate in a judgment of one of the following
three types: 67 (I) condemnation to punishment, ( 2) acquittal, (3)
dismissal of proceedings (StPO 260). For a conviction the court must
be clearly satisfied that the defendant is guilty. An acquittal occurs
when the innocence of the accused is established or his guilt remains in
doubt; the reasons of the judgment must contain a statement as to
which of these two alternatives is the case (StPO 267). If the accused
is charged in several counts, he may be acquitted on one and punished
on the other. One and the same count, however, can never be disposed
of by partial acquittal and partial condemnation; if the court reaches
the conclusion that the act covered by this count deserves a legal classification different from the one assumed in the order to hold for trial, it
simply punishes the accused for his offense under the new subsumption
(cf. topic IV, subtopic F, supra). A judgment of dismissal must be
entered when the court finds that a necessary jurisdictional fact is lacking. This can happen, for example, when the prohibition of double
jeopardy or the statute of limitations comes into play or wh,en a required application for punishment by the injured party is missing or
withdrawn; the latter case is expressly stated in StPO 260.
In addition, every judgment must contain a ruling on the liability
for costs ( StPO 464). Omitting details, the general rules are that a
convicted person is liable for costs; and that in case of acquittal or dismissal costs are b_orne by the public or by the private party who withdraws an application for prosecution or fails to substantiate the same
(StPO 465,467,470, 471).
B. Effects
The primary effect of a judgment is its executionability. A sentence .
inflicting punishment is executed only after the judgment has become
final (StPO 449).68 The power to issue the orders necessary to set the
law is represented by the power, granted to the court at the same time, to be content
with a "selective ascertainment" (Wahlfeststellung). Thereby the court was permitted
to choose the mildest of several provisions of criminal law, if it is impossible to ascertain
· facts sufficient to establish beyond doubt that the accused has violated a certain one
among them, but the court is convinced that he has committed some offense falling
-somehow under one of these provisions. It is· worth mentioning that even before the
enactment of this statute, i.e., on May 2, 1934, the Supreme Court had permitted the
same procedure in a case where it was impossible to ascertain whether the accused was
guilty of larceny or receiving stolen goods, while he was doubtless guilty of either one
or the other of these crimes (68 Entscheidungen des Reichsgerichts in Strafsachen 257).
67 Individual hearings may of course terminate in incidental rulings, such as
adjournment, temporary staying of proceedings, •or certification of the case to the
tribunal exercising jurisdiction.
68
A detention suffered by a prisoner prior to the judgment can in the discretion
of the court be counted against the term fixed by his sentence (StGB 60) ; and deten-
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execution in motion, as well as the supervision of persons and institutions charged with the carrying out of the execution, is in general vested
in the prosecutor (StPO 451 ). However, a number of states, including
Prussia, have availed themselves of the opportunity (StPO 451) to
vest these functions in the Amtsrichter in all cases where the original
trial is held by the Amtsgericht; in juvenile cases execution of penal
sentences is always in the hands of the judge (JGG 36). Doubts concerning the construction of a criminal sentence or the computation of a
penalty inflicted, as well as objections to the methods of execution
employed by the authorities charged with enforcement, are in all cases
settled by the Amtsgericht; no hearing is necessary, but the prosecutor,
if in charge of the execution, and the convicted man must be given a
chance to state their views and claims, and the decision of the court is
open to review by the higher court (StPO 458,462).
Another important effect of the final judgment was, up to a few
years ago, the bar of a second prosecution for the same offense, a principle analogous to the double jeopardy principle of Anglo-American
law. This principle is not indeed stated explicitly anywhere in the Code
of Criminal Procedure. It is implied in the provisions which state
the cases in which a person tried once can be faced with a new trial on
the same charge.
Two sets of cases are important and need to be distinguished. First
are cases where new trials occur in the ordinary processes of review and
reversal. There is one point of peculiar interest in the German practice
here; the prosecution can demand a review of an acquittal; the acquittal
does not bar a further prosecution as it does in Anglo-American law.
Otherwise the possibilities of reviewing judgments and obtaining new
trials are not substantially different (see topic :VI, infra).
Second are certain cases in which it is possible to have a retrial after
final judgment. German law groups these cases under the caption:
resumption of proceedings (Wiederaufnahme des Verfahrens). This
can occur at the instance of either prosecutor or accused 69 if the judgment was based on a forged document or perjured testimony or was corruptly given. In addition, a resumption in favor of the accused is also
possible if the criminal judgment was based on a civil judgment which
was later quashed, 70 or if new facts are discovered which would have
tion after judgment must be so counted insofar as it is suffered after the judgment has
become final with respect to the prisoner (StPO 450).
69
Resumption in favor of the accused can also be demanded by the prosecutor;
and if the accused is dead, also by his spouse, ascendants, descendants, brothers, and
sisters.
70
Ordinarily the criminal court investigates, with the methods of criminal pro-
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called for the acquittal of the accused or for the application of a criminal statute providing for milder punishment. On the other hand, proceedings can also be resumed against a person acquitted who after his
acquittal has made a credible ~onfession of guilt, either judicial or extrajudicial (see StPO 395, 362).71
·
Down to 1937 the resumption of proceedings was strictly limited to
the few cases just mentioned. Its scope was found in StPO 264 which
defines the scope of the trial (see topic IV, subtopic F, supra). This
was unanimously interpreted to mean that the right of the state to
prosecute a person for certain acts must oe considered exhausted even if
new angles or facts are discovered which would give those acts a
changed legal aspect and which might, if known before, have justified
punishment unde~ a more severe statute; as has just been stated, discovery of new facts can under the Code of Criminal Procedure be a
cause for resumption of proceedings only in favor of the accused. By
the sam~ token, in combination with StPO 264 (see topic IV, subtopic
F, supra), it was held self-evident that no partial judgment reserving
certain aspects of a complex of criminal acts for a later trial could be
rendered.
The abandonment of these principles has been one of the most
cedure, also questions of civil law on which a criminal decision may depend. It may,
however, order the parties in a civil controversy to procure a decision by a civil court
and base its own decision on the view taken by the civil court (StPO 262). In any
case use of the .findings of another court is made under the principle of free valuation
of the evidence; never are civil judgments legally binding on a criminal court, or vice
versa.
71
Application for a resumption of proceedings must be directed to the court that
rendered the judgment. This court decides on its propriety in an informal proceeding,
giving a chance of stating their views and claims to both the accused and the prosecutor
and taking such evidence as it deems necessary. If it reaches the conclusion that the
application has a reasonable chance of success, it orders a new trial; in case the accused
on whose behalf the application was made is dead, and in other cases with the prosecutor's consent, it may even render a judgment of acquittal without a new trial. All
decisions, with· the exception of judgments, can be attacked by way of complaint
(Beschwerde) by either the prosecutor or the accused or by persons acting on his
behalf (generally: StPO 365-372). A resumption based on a criminal act (forgery,
perjury, corruption) requires a previous conviction on account of such act or the
dropping of proceedings merely for lack of evidence (StPO 364). ·Under the former
law a resumption initiated in favor of the accused never led to a deterioration of his
status resulting from the judgment attacked (StPO 373); this has been changed by
the Strafprozessnovelle of 1935. A statute of May 20, 1898, provides an indemnity
for persons acquitted through resumption of proceedings. In actual practice resumptions
are very rare, since courts are rather reluctant to grant resumption. As a typical example
may be cited the Prussian statistics for 1932. During that' year only 107 resumption
proceedings were dealt with by Prussian Amtsgerichte and Landgerichte, and part of
those dealt with by the latter probably were appellate cases. 95 Justiz-Ministerial-Blatt
335, 351.
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serious encroachments on guarantees embodied in the Code of Criminal
Procedure that has been brought about under the impact of National
Socialism. The reversal of the former attitude was first achieved simply
by a new construction of existing legal provisions. The Oberlandesgericht in Munich in r937 and the People's Tribunal and the Kammergericht (Oberlandesgericht) in Berlin in r938 held that StPO 264
must not be construed to preclude a renewal of the prosecution if an
outwardly minor crime had actually had the character of a serious offense against vital interests of the political leadership of the state, ,but
this character had not been realized by the court that tried the case. 72
It is true that this theory was not allowed to make its way unchallenged.
The Supreme Court of the Reich upheld the traditional principle as
late as r938. 73 It is impossible at this distance to ascertain how completely the new attitude was adopted by the regular courts. But it is
perhaps not without significance that Hitler felt the need to enact a
special statute of September r6, r939, which enabled the chief prosecutors of the Supreme Court and of the People's Tribunal to bring to
new trial cases terminated by final judgment if they entertain "grave
doubts as to the correctness of the judgment"; this power is to be
exercised by way of an "extraordinary objection" to be decided upon
by a special senate of the respective court, and it must be exercised
within a year's time. This statute, if there still was any doubt, marked
the definite end of the prohibition of double jeopardy in the Third
Reich.
C. Summary Judgment 74
German law provides a summary procedure for petty offenses and
certain misdemeanors. On complaint of the prosecutor and without
trial the single judge of the Amtsgericht can issue a conditional order
inflicting a fine 711 or imprisonment of not more than three months
(Strafbefehl; literally: penal order ).76 This order is not final; the
person against whom it issues can file an objection within one week after
the order is served on him. In case of objection the court holds a trial,
unless the prosecutor withdraws the complaint (StPO 409, 4II ). A
trial is also required when the judge doubts the propriety of the or.der
72

See FRAENKEL, THE DuAL STATE 51 ff. ( 1941).
See ibid.
74
The method described here should not be confused with the abbreviated procedure provided for in StPO 212, see topic III, sec. 5, supra.
711
Maximum fines are fixed by the Criminal Code and other statutes and vary
with different offenses.
76
Compare the Mahnverfahren in civil procedure. See Shartel and Wolff, "Civil
Justice in Germany," 42 M1cH. L. REv. 863 at 891 (1944).
73
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asked for by the state's attorney { StPO 408). The trial follows in general the ordinary rules of procedure. 77 The court is free to decide in any
way it sees fit; it may acquit the accused or reduce or enhance the penalty inflicted by the order ( StPO 4r I). 78
Even the police may issue penal orders in certain petty cases, inflicting small fines or detention up to two weeks ( StPO 4r 3). In this
case too the affected person can secure a judicial trial by filing, within a
week, an application therefor (StPO 4r4-4r8). Similar procedures
exist with regard to tax offenses, the tax collecting authorities having
the power of issuing penal orders and the offender having the right
of obtaining trial by an application for a judicial decision (StPO 4r9429).10

VI

METHODS OF REVIEW

The methods of review used in criminal procedure are the same as
those used in civil procedure.80 The chief methods are three: (I)
Beschwerde (complaint) to review incidental orders (BeschlUsse),
mainly on questions of procedure; (2) Berufung, to review as to fact
and law; (3) Revision, to review merely as to questions of law. All
three methods are equally available to prosecutor and accused; the
statutory agent or husband of an accused may also employ any of the
three methods (StPO 296, 298).
As in civil procedure, the Beschwerde exists in two forms: (I) as
einfache Beschwerde ( simple complaint) ; ( 2) as sofortige Beschwerde
(immediate complaint). The cases of the latter are specified by law; 81
the former is available against all other decisions unless these are declared final by statutory provision.82 Either kind is filed with the court
77
There is one exception; if the accused does not appear either ill person or by
authorized counsel, his objection is summarily turned down (StPO 412).
78
Much use is made of this procedure. The statistics for 1927 offer .a typical
example. Out of 1,406,106 cases handled by courts of the first instance in that year,
831,677 were applications for issuance of a judicial penal order (Statistisches Jahrbuch
fiir das Deutsche Reich 1929, p. 476).
,
79 An elaborate procedure in federal tax offenses is laid down in the Federal Tax
Code (Reichsabgabenordnung) 385-449.
80
See Shartel and Wolff, "Civil Justice in Germany," 42 M1cH. L. REV. 863
at 904, note 97 (1944).
·
81
Examples: refusal to open a preliminary judicial examination (StPO 183) or
to issue an order to hold for trial (StPO 210); order to confine a person in an insane
asylum for the purpose of observation (StPO 8 I) ; orders concerning execution of
punishment (StPO 462).
S2 A simple complaint lies, for instance, against warrants and other coercive me:tsures, or against incidental orders concerning the appointment of counsel for the defense.
No c9mplaint is allowed, among other cases, against orders to open a preliminary judicial
examination or to hold for trial or to certify a case to the court having jurisdiction.
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that issued the decision attacked. The immediate complaint must be
fil,ed within a week's time, the simple complaint is not subject to any
limitation as to time. The Beschwerde does not have the effect of
automatically suspending the execution of the order attacked. It is
disposed of in an informal procedure; no hearing is required. A simple
complaint is submitted to the superior court only if the court which
issued the order is unwilling to reconsider its decision; but an immediate complaint must always be submitted to the higher court (generally: StPO 304-3u).
Berufung and Revision are the methods for reviewing judgments.
Both must be filed within a week in the court that rendered the judgment attacked.83 If no appeal is taken by either "party" within this
period, the judgment becomes final as to him. The same e:ffect follows
from a waiver or withdrawal of appeal which may be declared at any
time (StPO 302). The state's attorney can indeed withdraw his appeal
only with the consent of the accused; and, after the beginning of a
hearing in the appellate court, the accused also needs the consent of the
prosecutor if he wants to withdraw his appeal (StPO 302, 303). 'J;'he
judge presiding at the trial, when he has pronounced judgment, has to
advise the accused as to his possible right to demand a review ( StPO
268); this advice is commonly combined with a question whether the
accused waives his right to appeal. Within another week the Berufung
may be, and the Revision has to be, supplemented by a statement of
reasons (StPO 317, 345). The Berufung may be general or be confined to certain points, e.g., the measure of the punishment (StPO
318).
The court that rendered the judgment attacked rejects the appeal
immediately, if the period for filing has expired (StPO 319, 346). If
the demand for review has been filed on time, the case passes to the
appellate court.8 ' The latter rejects the demand, if it finds that its
formal requirements were not met; 85 otherwise it schedules a hearing
(StPO 322,349).
The hearing following a Berufung is a complete new trial which,
88

The week begins with the pronouncement of the judgment; but if the accused

is not in court when the judgment is pronounced, he may file his demand for review
within a week after the judgment is served on him (StPO 314, 341).
H The record is handed over to the prosecutor of the trial court, who transmits it
to the state's attorney at the appellate court; the latter in turn delivers it to the appellate
court (StPO 320, 321). In case of Revision, the prosecutor of the court whose judgment is attacked sends the record to the higher court after the opponent of the appellant
has stated his views or failed to do so within a week (StPO 347).
85
The Supreme Court also rejects the Revision without a hearing, if, in the
unanimous opinion of all its members, it is obviously devoid pf foundation (StPO 349).
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save for a few modifications, follows the lines of the original trial
(StPO 323, 332). It begins with a report by one of the judges of the
appellate court and with a reading of the judgment attacked (StPO
324). New evidence may be produced. Witnesses and experts heard
in the first trial do not have to be summoned again, unless a new examination of them promises worthwhile results (StPO 323). If the appeal
attacks only certain po1nts of the judgment, the new trial is confined
to these points (StPO 327). An appeal filed by the accused is turned
down at once, if without excuse he fails to appear in person or by counsel 86 in the appellate court. The hearing of an appeal filed by the
prosecutor may proceed in the absence of the accused; the court may,
however, order the accused to be arrested or brought to the hearing by
force '(StPO 329). The court can, depending on the outcome of the
hearing, reject the appeal; or r~nder a new judgment; or, under certain circumstances, set the first judgment aside and send the case back
to the :first court for a new trial (StPO 328).
More simple is of course the procedure of the court deciding on a
Revision. No evidence is taken. The accused may attend the hearing
or be represented by counsel (StPO 350). If the court does find legal
error in the judgment, ·it can refer the case back to the court whence it
came 87 or render a new judgment; the latter occurs when the new
judgment is. for acquittal, for an absolute penalty ( such as death in case
of murder in the first degree), or for the minimum penalty provided
by law in a given case ( StPO 3 54).
.
Any appeal filed by the state's attorney, whether in favor of (see
StPO 2 76) or against the accused, may result in an improvement of the
latter's position (StPO 301). However, with respect to appeals filed
in favor of the accused, whether by himself or by the state's attorney,
pre-Nazi law ,provided that it could never result in a deterioration of
the accused's position (StPO 331, 358). The Nazis, in pursuance of
their tendency toward abolition of the double jeopardy principle, have
changed this in their Strafprozessnovelle of l 93 5; now any appeal may
result in the disadvantage of the accused.
The 1924 version of the Code of Criminal Procedure permitted the
Berufung against any judgment of the Amtsgericht, whether the single
judge or the Schoffengericht, with the exception of judgments of the
single judge in petty cases acquitting the defendant or imposing a mere
fi.~e (StPO 312, 313). Such judgments, as well as those of the jury
86

supra).
87

I.e., when such is permitted under the general rules (see topic IV, subtopic C,

It may also refer the case to a neighboring court of the same level.
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court, could be attacked only by Revision; this also was the method for
reviewing an appellate judgment of the Criminal Chamber of the
Landgericht (StPO 333, 334). Review by way of Revision might always be elected instead of Berufung whenever the latter was permissible; in case one side :filed a Berufung and the other asked for Revision
the review was treated as a case of Berufung (StPO 335). No appeal
at all was allowed in cases in the original jurisdiction of the Oberlandesgericht and the Supreme Court of the Reich. In recent years,
beginning even before Hitler's advent to power, a steady curtailment of
the chances of review has been in progress, due partially to :fiscal and
partially to political reasons. Now, according to the war emergency
decree of September r, r939, no criminal judgment' can be reviewed
more than once. The method is Berufung in all cases of original jurisdiction of the Amtsgericht, and Revision in matters falling in the original jurisdiction of the Landgericht. 88 Judgments of the political tribunals of the Nazis have never been reviewable.
It was stated at the beginning of this article that, in the opinion of
the author, the pre-Hitler system of criminal justice will offer a safe
basis for a restoration of law and order in post-Hitler Germany. However, the confusion caused by many years of Nazi administration of
justice is so great that it will not be sufficient merely to set in motion
again the old machinery. It may therefore be permitted to add to the
preceding presentation of that machinery a few suggestions concerning
measures which might be helpful in overcoming the difficulties likely to
arise during the period of transition. The author must refrain from
going into details; nor is it his intention to take a stand on questions of
long-range refor.qi of criminal procedure which may prove desirable.
I. As regards court organization, there is of course no doubt that
the political courts of the Nazis, i.e., the People's Tribunal and the
Special Tribunals, should and will disappear together with their regime.
All administration of criminal justice must be handed back to the ordinary courts as soon and as far as circumstances will permit. 89 Lay participation in the form of the employment of Schoffen, which can look
back on a long and successful history in Germany, should be restored
immediately.
Where the Landgericht acts in the place of the former "jury court'' (see t0pic
I, subtopic B, supra).
89 This is not intended to exclude either the creation by the United Nations of
special tribunals to try war offenders or the creation inside Germany of special tribunals
to try Nazi party and state officials for misbehavior.
88
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2. In the matter of prosecution, it would go a long way in restoring
the general feeling of security and, with it, respect for law if official
discretion as to when and whom to prosecute were strictly and definitely
limited. This would mean the abolition of the Opp9rtunitatsprinzip
( see topic III, subtopic A, supra) as introduced by the reform of I 924.
It is true that this principle held good only for minor offenses, and no
opinion is ventured here as to whether or not it may be desirable under
normal conditions. But, in the first period of restoration of law and
order, strict adherence to the principle of legality will serve to allay
fears and suspicions which are bound to arise as to the impartiality of
the prosecuting agencies and may obstruct th~ return of a smoothly
working and trusted administration of justice.
3. Coupled with the trimming down of official discretion in matters
of procedure and prosecution should be the abolition of the totalitarian
principle of punishment by analogy for acts which run counter to the
, "sound feeling of the people." There is no question but that arbitrariness in prosecution and national socialist propaganda have done much
to pervert the general sense of justice in the populace. A strict adherence to the written law is the needed antidote for the effects of this
p01son.
· 4. The restoration of the principle of res judicata will have to be
one of the first steps to be taken. However, it is doubtful how far this
principle can be applied ex· post facto to Nazi acts. A W?,Y must be
found to reverse judgments and other decisions taken by judicial and
prosecuting authorities in pursuance of Nazi tenets. Sentences forcertain offenses created by the legislation of the Nazis on the basis of their
philosophy might simply be declared void by a legislative act. But in
many cases the formal basis of a conviction was a generally recognized
crime, even if its actual foundation was not reconcilable with commonly
accepted legal or moral conceptions; there were also equally unjustifiable acquittals and cases where prosecut~on was omitted for "party" reasons. No restoration of a true state of law and order is conceivable that
would allow such decisions to stand. The introduction of a new ground
for "resumption of proceedings" (see topic V, subtopic B, supra) in
such cases, to be initiated ex officio or on the motion of the interested
party, would certainly not be incompatibl~ with the principle of finality
of judgments, provided the conditions, forms, and time limits of such
resumption were clearly defined by law.

